电工技术学报  2019, Vol. 34 Issue (zk2): 729-741    DOI: 10.19595/j.cnki.1000-6753.tces.L80283
电力系统 |
源荷双侧不确定因素影响下基于Rubinstein博弈的电网双层定价模型
李力行1, 2, 苗世洪1, 2, 余璟3, 涂青宇1, 2, 段偲默1, 2
1. 华中科技大学电气与电子工程学院强电磁工程与新技术国家重点实验室 武汉 430074;
2. 华中科技大学电气与电子工程学院电力安全与高效湖北省重点实验室 武汉 430074;
3. 国网江苏省电力有限公司 南京 210000
Double-Layer Pricing Model of Power Grid Based on Rubinstein Game under the Influence of Source-Side and Load-Side Uncertainty
Li Lixing1, 2, Miao Shihong1, 2, Yu Jing3, Tu Qingyu1, 2, Duan Simo1, 2
1. State Key Laboratory of Advanced Electromagnetic Engineering and Technology School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan 430074 China;
2. Hubei Electric Power Security and High Efficiency Key Laboratory School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan 430074 China;
3. State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co. Ltd Nanjing 210000 China
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摘要 随着电力市场的进一步开放以及可再生能源渗透率的不断提升,电网电能交易的多元化、复杂化给电网的调度运行带来了新的挑战。针对部分开放电力市场环境下考虑不确定性的多主体电能交易机制下的协同调度、博弈问题,提出了源荷双侧不确定因素影响下基于Rubinstein博弈的电网双层定价模型。首先,考虑我国当前电力市场的开放进程,建立考虑社会福利最大化的调度博弈双层定价机制;其次,考虑可再生能源、柔性负荷等源荷双侧不确定性因素影响,建立大电网随机机会约束规划模型;最后,考虑不同主体利益诉求,基于Rubinstein动态博弈模型,建立完全信息下的多主体议价机制,并求解得到该模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡。以PJM5节点系统为例,仿真结果验证了模型的有效性。结果表明,该方法在兼顾各参与人利益的同时,降低了发电成本,实现了社会总效益与风电消纳量的提升。
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李力行
苗世洪
余璟
涂青宇
段偲默
关键词 多利益主体电力市场完全信息动态博弈源荷双侧不确定性鲁宾斯坦议价模型    
Abstract:With the further opening of the electricity market and the increasing in the penetration rate of renewable energy sources, the complexity of power grid electricity transactions have brought challenges to the operation of power grids. This paper proposes a dual-tier pricing model based on Rubinstein game under the influence of source-side and load-side uncertainty. First, based on the current opening process of China's electricity market, a two-tiered pricing mechanism for scheduling game with consideration of maximizing social welfare is established. Secondly, considering the influence of uncertainties on both sides of source and load, a stochastic chance-constrained programming model for large power grid is established. Finally, based on Rubinstein's dynamic game model, the multi-agent bargaining mechanism under complete information is established, and the game subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is solved. Taking the PJM5 node system as an example, the simulation results verify the validity of the model. The results show that the proposed method satisfies the interests of all participants, reduces the cost of power generation, and realizes the improvement of total social benefits and wind power consumption.
Key wordsMulti-stakeholder    power market    complete information dynamic game    source-side and load-side uncertainty    Rubinstein bargaining model   
收稿日期: 2018-07-01      出版日期: 2020-01-02
PACS: TM73  
作者简介: 李力行 男,1992年生,博士研究生,研究方向为大电网不确定性调度及电力市场多主体博弈。E-mail: lilixing123123@126.com;苗世洪 男,1963年生,博士,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为电力系统继电保护与运行控制、大电网协同调度等。E-mail: shmiao@hust.edu.cn(通信作者)
引用本文:   
李力行, 苗世洪, 余璟, 涂青宇, 段偲默. 源荷双侧不确定因素影响下基于Rubinstein博弈的电网双层定价模型[J]. 电工技术学报, 2019, 34(zk2): 729-741. Li Lixing, Miao Shihong, Yu Jing, Tu Qingyu, Duan Simo. Double-Layer Pricing Model of Power Grid Based on Rubinstein Game under the Influence of Source-Side and Load-Side Uncertainty. Transactions of China Electrotechnical Society, 2019, 34(zk2): 729-741.
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