电工技术学报  2019, Vol. 34 Issue (zk2): 742-751    DOI: 10.19595/j.cnki.1000-6753.tces.L80719
电力系统 |
基于主从博弈的充电服务商充电引导方法及其定价策略
史一炜1, 冯冬涵1, EllaZhou2, 方陈3
1. 电力传输与功率变换控制教育部重点实验室(上海交通大学) 上海 200240;
2. 美国国家可再生能源实验室 戈尔登 80401;
3. 国网上海市电力公司电力科学研究院 上海 200437
Stackelberg Game Based on Supervised Charging Method and Pricing Strategy of Charging Service Providers
Shi Yiwei1, Feng Donghan1, Ella Zhou2, Fang Chen3
1. Key Laboratory of Control of Power Transmission and Conversion Ministry of Education Shanghai Jiao Tong University Shanghai 200240 China;
2. National Renewable Energy Laboratory Golden 80401 America;
3. Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Shanghai Municipal Electric Power CompanyShanghai 200437 China
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摘要 大规模电动汽车接入电网充电将给电网带来大量新增负荷,同时也提供了需求响应资源,智能化的充电终端及相应充电服务模式将是下一阶段的研究重点。智能充电终端根据电价信号自主规划充电,将充电自主权掌握在用户手中,与发布电价、出售电能的主体间形成了主从博弈。求解这一主从博弈可以得到反映单台电动汽车充电属性的边际充电价格以及充电服务商定价策略。提出基于价格信号的充电引导方法,各充电终端与服务商间仅进行电价信号的实时通信,适宜在实时电价机制下运行。对下辖200个智能终端的充电服务商的仿真结果显示,这一实时电价引导的充电策略可以兼顾双方利益,同时充电负荷对电价信号表现出良好的响应特性,为服务商聚合充电资源向电网提供服务提供了条件。
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关键词 电动汽车充电服务商主从博弈边际价格充电策略    
Abstract:The charging of large-scale electric vehicles (EVs) brings about a large new load to the electricity network, while it is also a demand response resource. Smart charging equipment and patterns of charging service will be one of the research focuses at the next stage. Smart charging equipment schedules EV’s charging on the basis of electricity price, and this method enables users to hold the right of controlling their own EV’s charging procedure. Thus, there exists a Stackelberg game between charging service providers, who set the price, and independent EVs. The marginal charging price, which reflects properties of individual EV, and the pricing strategy of charging service providers can be derived through solving this game problem. A price based charging strategy is proposed, which is suitable for the dynamic electricity price mechanism because of its light communication burden. In a simulation of a charging service provider covering 200 smart devices, this real-time supervised charging strategy shows its advantages of curbing users’ payment and guiding the charging load effectively.
Key wordsElectric vehicle    charging service provider    Stackelberg game    marginal price    charging strategy   
收稿日期: 2018-07-10      出版日期: 2020-01-02
PACS: TM73  
  U469.72  
作者简介: 史一炜 男,1994年生,博士研究生,研究方向为电动汽车充电策略及电价定价机制等。E-mail: shiyiweisyw@gmail.com(通信作者)冯冬涵 男,1981年生,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为智能电网中的策略与风险、电力市场理论与设计等。E-mail: seed@sjtu.edu.cn
引用本文:   
史一炜, 冯冬涵, EllaZhou, 方陈. 基于主从博弈的充电服务商充电引导方法及其定价策略[J]. 电工技术学报, 2019, 34(zk2): 742-751. Shi Yiwei, Feng Donghan, Ella Zhou, Fang Chen. Stackelberg Game Based on Supervised Charging Method and Pricing Strategy of Charging Service Providers. Transactions of China Electrotechnical Society, 2019, 34(zk2): 742-751.
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