电工技术学报  2018, Vol. 33 Issue (15): 3499-3509    DOI: 10.19595/j.cnki.1000-6753.tces.170873
电力系统 |
多利益主体参与下主动配电网完全信息动态博弈行为
李力行1,2, 苗世洪1,2, 孙丹丹1,2, 李超1,2, 叶畅1,2
1. 华中科技大学电气与电子工程学院强电磁工程与新技术国家重点实验室 武汉 430074;
2. 华中科技大学电气与电子工程学院电力安全与高效湖北省重点实验室 武汉 430074
Dynamic Games of Complete Information in Active Distribution Network with Multi - Stakeholder Participation
Li Lixing1,2, Miao Shihong1,2, Sun Dandan1,2, Li Chao1,2, Ye Chang1,2
1. State Key Laboratory of Advanced Electromagnetic Engineering and Technology School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan 430074 China;
2. Hubei Electric Power Security and High Efficiency Key Laboratory School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan 430074 China
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摘要 随着电力市场进一步开放,主动配电网电能交易的多元化、复杂化为主动配电网的调度运行带来了新的挑战。针对主动配电网多利益主体参与下的调度问题,提出了多利益主体参与下主动配电网完全信息动态博弈策略。首先,考虑分布式电源、需求响应等调度资源,引入改进的“梯形效用函数模型”,建立了完全信息动态博弈下包括配电网运营商与负荷聚合商在内的多利益主体响应行为模型;其次,基于韦伯-费希纳定律,提出了序贯议价函数以表征序贯议价动态博弈中各参与人的博弈行为;最后,研究了主动配电网完全信息动态博弈流程,提出了动态博弈粒子群优化算法对问题进行求解。以华中某地级市实际配网为例,仿真结果验证了模型的有效性,结果还表明在开放电力市场环境下,主动配电网的完全信息动态博弈在兼顾各参与人利益的同时,降低了边际发电成本,实现了社会总效益与风电消纳量的提升。
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李力行
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叶畅
关键词 主动配电网博弈论需求响应多利益主体    
Abstract:With the further opening up of the electricity market, the diversification and complication of the transaction has brought new challenges for the active distribution network scheduling operation. The strategy of the dynamic game with complete information in active distribution network(ADN) has been proposed for the coordination problem of ADN. Firstly, considering the scheduling resources such as distributed generation, demand response and so on, an improved "trapezoidal utility function model" is introduced to establish a multi-stakeholder response behavior model including distribution network operators and load aggregators under the complete information dynamic game; Secondly, based on Weber Fischer's Law, a sequential bargaining function is present to characterize the game behavior of each participant in the dynamic game of sequential bargaining; Finally, the flow of dynamic game with complete information in ADN is studied, and the dynamic game particle swarm optimization algorithm is put forward to solve the problem. Taking the actual distribution network in central China as an example, the simulation results has verified the validity of the model. The results also show that the dynamic game with complete information in active distribution network shows following benefits: lower marginal power generation costs, more wind power consumption and higher total social benefits.
Key wordsActive distribution network    game theory    demand response    multi-stakeholder   
收稿日期: 2017-06-19      出版日期: 2018-08-14
PACS: TM73  
基金资助:国家重点研发计划项目(2016YFB0900400)、国家自然科学基金项目(51777088)和2018年国家电网公司总部科技项目资助
通讯作者: 苗世洪 男,1963年生,博士,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为电力系统继电保护与运行控制、微电网与配电网新技术等。E-mail:shmiao@hust.edu.cn   
作者简介: 李力行 男,1992年生,博士研究生,研究方向为主动配电网与分布式电源调度。E-mail:lilixing123123@126.com
引用本文:   
李力行, 苗世洪, 孙丹丹, 李超, 叶畅. 多利益主体参与下主动配电网完全信息动态博弈行为[J]. 电工技术学报, 2018, 33(15): 3499-3509. Li Lixing, Miao Shihong, Sun Dandan, Li Chao, Ye Chang. Dynamic Games of Complete Information in Active Distribution Network with Multi - Stakeholder Participation. Transactions of China Electrotechnical Society, 2018, 33(15): 3499-3509.
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