电工技术学报  2023, Vol. 38 Issue (9): 2448-2463    DOI: 10.19595/j.cnki.1000-6753.tces.220090
电力系统与综合能源 |
计及条件风险价值和综合需求响应的产消者能量共享激励策略
孙毅1, 李飞1,2, 胡亚杰1, 陈明昊1, 郑顺林1
1.华北电力大学电气与电子工程学院 北京 102206;
2.国网河北省电力有限公司 石家庄 050000
Energy Sharing Incentive Strategy of Prosumers Considering Conditional Value at Risk and Integrated Demand Response
Sun Yi1, Li Fei1,2, Hu Yajie1, Chen Minghao1, Zheng Shunlin1
1. School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering North China Electric Power University Beijing 102206 China;
2. State Grid Hebei Electric Power Co. Ltd Shijiazhuang 050000 China
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摘要 随着分布式新能源的广泛普及和用户用能需求的多元化,在综合能源交易市场下研究如何优化产消者的能源调度,并解决其剩余能源的交易问题具有重要意义。为此,该文提出了一种由综合能源服务商主导的产消者能量共享优化激励策略。首先,构建由综合能源服务商主导的产消者能量共享实施架构,并给出产消者中的能量枢纽模型;其次,考虑到新能源出力和产消者用能的不确定性,建立了计及条件风险价值和综合需求响应的产消者模型以及综合能源服务商模型;然后,建立产消者能量共享模型,并提出了基于市场贡献的利益再分配策略;最后,通过仿真验证了所提策略能够有效降低产消者的经济成本,提高参与各方的积极性,并为产消者在经济效益和风险水平之间的平衡提供了参考。
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孙毅
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陈明昊
郑顺林
关键词 条件风险价值综合需求响应产消者能量共享激励策略    
Abstract:With the wide spread of distributed new energy source and the multiple types of user's energy demand, traditional energy consumers are transforming into prosumers with both power production and consumption capabilities. In order to study the scheme of energy sharing between prosumers in the context of integrated energy, an incentive model for energy sharing between prosumers is designed, which considers the uncertainty risk of distributed new energy output and user electricity consumption and the integrated demand response. The integrated energy service provider (IESP) is the bridge between the energy market and prosumers, and forms a community of interests with multiple prosumers to lead the energy sharing activities between them. In order to promote the energy sharing between prosumers, it must be proved that all participants can benefit from the implementation of the energy sharing scheme. Therefore, the cost model of each participant before and after energy sharing needs to be established separately. Firstly, the basic cost model of integrated energy service provider and prosumers is established, and the conditional value at risk is used to represent the uncertainty risk of prosumers' electricity production and consumption. Secondly, based on the agreed energy sharing trading mechanism, the energy sharing incentive subsidy is used as a variable to establish an energy sharing model, that is, the cost of the community of interests is minimized. Then, the adaptive allocation strategy for shared benefits is designed, and the equivalent value of shared energy by prosumers is used to express their market contribution, so as to calculate the incentive subsidy amount. And based on the Nash game model, it is proved that the proposed energy sharing incentive mechanism has a unique optimal solution, and all participants can benefit from it.
In test 1, by controlling the existence of the two mechanisms of integrated demand response and energy sharing, it was found that integrated demand response could receive better economic benefits than energy sharing, and the combination of the two can further stimulate their respective advantages, reducing the overall cost by 21.63%. And the energy sharing mechanism can reduce the use of energy storage equipment by prosumers. In test 2, it is verified that the net cost savings of prosumers under the adaptive benefit allocation model are positively correlated with their market contribution, which ensures the fairness of market participants. The experiment on the change of risk weight shows that it is necessary to balance the overall economy and risk prevention. Finally, the qualitative analysis of energy trading price shows that the trading price between IESP and prosumers has little impact on the energy sharing strategy, while the energy price interacting with the energy market has obvious impact on the energy sharing strategy. When the power purchase price of IESP rises, the power sharing between prosumers will be more active. When the gas purchase price of IESP rises, the electricity and gas energy sharing between prosumers will be more active. When the price of electricity sold from the IESP increases, the overall sharing level will decline, and the prosumers will be more willing to transfer the surplus electricity to the external grid. Therefore, in the implementation of energy sharing scheme, the price policy of local energy market should be considered, and the integrated demand response can also be used together to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of prosumers.
Key wordsConditional value at risk (CVaR)    integrated demand response    prosumer    energy sharing    incentive strategy   
收稿日期: 2021-11-08     
PACS: TM73  
基金资助:国家电网有限公司科技资助项目(SGHEDK00DYJS2000044)
通讯作者: 胡亚杰 男,1997年生,硕士研究生,研究方向为综合能源需求响应技术等。E-mail:906361143@qq.com   
作者简介: 孙 毅 男,1972年生,博士,教授,研究方向为能源互联网及其信息通信技术,物联网及现代传感技术等。E-mail:sy@ncepu.edu.cn
引用本文:   
孙毅, 李飞, 胡亚杰, 陈明昊, 郑顺林. 计及条件风险价值和综合需求响应的产消者能量共享激励策略[J]. 电工技术学报, 2023, 38(9): 2448-2463. Sun Yi, Li Fei, Hu Yajie, Chen Minghao, Zheng Shunlin. Energy Sharing Incentive Strategy of Prosumers Considering Conditional Value at Risk and Integrated Demand Response. Transactions of China Electrotechnical Society, 2023, 38(9): 2448-2463.
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