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| Two-Level Game Theory-Based Economic Scheduling of Multi-Energy in Green Port Clusters |
| Dong Zhixing1, Wen Shuli1, Zhu Miao1, Hou Chuanchuan1, Ma Jianjun1, Wu Zhijian2 |
1. Key Laboratory of Control of Power Transmission and Conversion Ministry of Education Shanghai Jiao Tong University Shanghai 200240 China;
2. State Grid Suzhou Power Supply Company Suzhou 215004 China |
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Abstract The optimization scheduling of energy systems within green port clusters poses a multifaceted challenge, encompassing intricate relationships among port grids, public grids, inter-port dynamics, and ship connections. A comprehensive and sophisticated approach is necessary for addressing these diverse and conflicting interests. This study proposes a tailored two-level game theory-based optimization scheduling model, which is designed for green port clusters. The aim of this is to enhance the economic efficiency of the regional grid, improve the utilization of renewable energy resources, and foster environmental sustainability within the broader framework of port cluster development.
The methodology employed in this study is grounded in the establishment of a hierarchical game model. At the first level, the regional grid of the port cluster acts as a pivotal leadership role, which is tasked with managing energy distribution within the local port cluster and determining energy prices in a way that maximizes economic benefits while ensuring the stability and reliability of the energy supply. The regional grid considers the complex dynamics of energy demand and supply within the port cluster, as well as the potential ripple effects of its decisions on the interconnected public grid. This comprehensive understanding allows the regional grid to formulate strategies that strike a balance between economic efficiency and energy security. At the second level, individual port microgrid systems act as followers, devising energy supply strategies that cater to ships accessing port onshore power while ensuring adequate power supply within the port area. These microgrid systems operate within the broader framework set by the regional grid, adjusting their strategies in response to changes in energy prices and supply conditions. This two-level interaction creates a dynamic and responsive energy system that can adapt to the evolving needs of the port cluster.
The two-level game model is then transformed into a two-level optimization problem, which was reformulated into a single-level optimization problem for efficient solution. The simulation results demonstrated that the proposed novel energy optimization approach for green port clusters transcends the limitations of onshore integrated systems, overcoming the shortcomings of conventional scheduling methods in addressing the diverse requirements of multiple stakeholders, while enhancing the economic efficiency of the regional grid within the port cluster, augmenting the utilization of renewable energy resources, and fostering environmental sustainability.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the simulation analysis: (1) The proposed two-level game model for green port clusters optimizes energy scheduling by balancing the interests of port clusters and regional power grids, leveraging port-specific energy differences. This results in a 16.32% increase in operational efficiency and enhanced renewable energy integration. (2) Considering economic costs, natural resource endowments, and price sensitivity, the model satisfies diverse port interests, optimizing the overall benefits of green port clusters. (3) Ports with shore power systems outperform traditional ports, with a 57.22% increase in benefits under the two-level game scenario. This incentivizes investment in renewable energy and shore power equipment, meanwhile reducing carbon emissions.
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Received: 14 August 2024
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2025, Vol. 40 
