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| A State-of-the-Art Review on Stackelberg Game and Its Applications in Power Market |
| Zhang Heng1, Zhang Shenxi1, Cheng Haozhong1, Zhang Xipeng2, Gu Qingfa3 |
1. Key Laboratory of Control of Power Transmission and Conversion of Ministry of Education Shanghai Jiao Tong University Shanghai 200240 China;
2. Shanghai Electric Power Company Shibei Power Supply Company Shanghai 200070 China;
3. Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Henan Electric Power Company Zhengzhou 450052 China |
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Abstract With increasing penetration of renewables to the electricity grid, commercialization of energy storage technology, diversification of demand side management resources type, and maturity of multi-energy complementation, more and more stakeholders are being progressively introduced into source-grid-load of power systems. However, due to trading volume and market position, the decision-makers have different priorities. The application of Stackelberg game theory, which has master-slave hierarchical structure, was investigated in this manuscript to solve sequential decision-making problems in investment and energy trading under the deregulated environment. Firstly, the mathematical structure of Stackelberg game was described, and it was classified according to the number of players in the master/slave problems; then, the application of Stackelberg game in power market was sorted out, and equivalent transformation skills, the advantages and disadvantages of various solving methods were summarized; finally, the key scientific problems still existing in the application of Stackelberg game in power market were refined. It is hoped that the work can provide a method reference for those stakeholders who participate in sequential decision-making in power market.
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Received: 11 May 2021
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| Fund:上海市青年科技英才扬帆计划资助项目（20YF1418900） |
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2022, Vol. 37 
