大电网省地电压调控的博弈收益函数建模

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Abstract A payoff function model which consists of the control effects and costs that concerned by both players is proposed for the game of Voltage control between provincial and district power grids. The payoff model, in which the weight coefficients reflect each participant’s interesting degree towards control effects and costs, is the function of game institutions, interesting extents of participants towards the related indexes and strategy combinations. The influence of game institutions on calculation methods of payoff function and Nash Equilibrium is investigated to reveal the game mechanism of mismatch problem between the provincial and local grids. The Nash Equilibrium of three different kinds of game institutions is compared and analyzed through the simulation on a real regional power grid. The results show that the key of solving voltage control mismatch problem and making participants’ dominant strategies in accordance with the optimization of the whole power system should be lain in changing the cognition in the interesting degree towards voltage control examining indexes and building a rational cooperative institution.

Key words： Power grids voltage control mismatch game theory payoff function

Received: 21 March 2012 Published: 25 March 2014

PACS:

TM714.2

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	Zhang Yongjun
	Li Qifeng
	Zhang Xitian

Cite this article:

Zhang Yongjun,Li Qifeng,Zhang Xitian. Gawe Payoff Function Modeling for Game of Provincial and District Voltage Control in Large-Scale Power Grids[J]. Transactions of China Electrotechnical Society, 2013, 28(3): 254-260.

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http://dgjsxb.ces-transaction.com/EN/ OR http://dgjsxb.ces-transaction.com/EN/Y2013/V28/I3/254

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