面向差异化电源成本结构的容量市场机制设计

doi:10.19595/j.cnki.1000-6753.tces.231474

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摘要

在新型电力系统中,容量市场起到补偿电源投资成本、引导电源合理投资的重要作用。然而,新型电力系统中存在新能源和灵活性电源等不同类型电源,其成本结构差异显著。当前研究尚缺乏容量市场机制对差异化电源成本结构的适用性探讨,鲜有研究提出相应的机制改进策略。本文通过定量推导说明,现有容量市场机制下将产生差异化成本结构电源的“搭车”现象,难以对不同类型电源施加差异化的投资激励信号。对此,本文提出了一种新能源和灵活性电源分平台竞价的容量市场组织模式,构建了表征容量市场投资激励效用的投资模拟计算方法,提出了基于投资激励效用闭环反馈的容量市场关键参数设定策略,形成了面向差异化电源成本结构的容量市场机制。算例结果表明,所提机制能实现新能源和灵活性电源差异化的容量补偿需求,在可控的容量补偿费用下引导更合理的电源结构发展,支撑新型电力系统建设。

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	李琪瑞
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关键词 ：容量市场, 成本结构差异, 容量需求曲线, 发电容量充裕性, 发电投资

Abstract：

Capacity market is one important solution for the arising generation adequacy issues in power system by compensating for the investment costs of sources and stimulating generation investment. However, due to the differentiated cost structures of different types of sources, such as renewable energy sources and flexible power sources, existing capacity market is difficult to provide effective differentiated investment incentive signals to guide a rational generation investment. Recent research lacks the exploration of capacity market to the differentiated cost structures of power sources, and few studies have proposed corresponding improvement strategies. To address these issues, this paper analyzed the problems in capacity market caused by differentiated cost structures and proposed a capacity market design considering the differentiated cost structures of power sources.
Firstly, the paper explained the issues in existing capacity market by taking the phenomenon of “free-riding” of renewable energy sources as an example and then provided further illustration through quantitative analysis. Secondly, the paper proposed a capacity market organization model with sub-platform biddings for renewable energy and flexible power sources. Thirdly, to set appropriate market parameters so as to coordinate the difference in cost structures of sources, an investment simulation method was proposed to model investment incentive utility in the capacity market, and a strategy for setting key parameters based on the closed-loop feedback of the investment incentive utility was developed. The proposed capacity market design can satisfy the differentiated capacity compensation demand of renewable energy sources and flexible power sources, guide the development of a more reasonable source structure under a controllable capacity compensation cost, and support the construction of the new power system.
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed capacity market design, simulations were conducted on a system with one type of wind power source and three types of coal power sources. Simulation results show that the investment of renewable energy sources in the current capacity market mechanism is much higher than a preset investment goal, while in the proposed capacity market design, the capacity development of both renewable energy sources and flexible sources can follow the investment goal pretty well. The revenue ratio of each type of sources in current capacity market has higher fluctuations than that in the proposed capacity market design. Also, the current capacity market cannot guarantee the full cost recovery of each power source while the proposed capacity market design can provide sufficient but not excessive capacity compensation for each source. Meanwhile, in terms of economy, the proposed capacity market design can lower the market operation cost while guaranteeing the full cost recovery of capacity.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the simulation analysis: (1) In the existing capacity market, there exists a phenomenon of “free-ridding” due to the differentiated cost structures of power sources. (2) The proposed capacity market design can stimulate reasonable capacity investment by satisfying the different capacity compensation demand of renewable energy sources and flexible energy sources. (3) The proposed capacity market design reduces the market operation cost by avoiding paying renewable energy sources an additional payment that is caused by the “free-ridding” of renewable energy sources.

Key words： Capacity markets cost structure differences capacity demand curve generation capacity adequacy generation investment

收稿日期: 2023-09-07

PACS:

TM73

基金资助:

国家自然科学基金（52177072）和重庆英才计划项目（CQYC2021059365）资助

通讯作者: 杨知方男,1992年生,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为电力系统优化、电力市场等。E-mail：zfyang@cqu.edu.cn

作者简介: 李琪瑞女,1994年生,博士研究生,研究方向为电力市场。E-mail：qiruili@cqu.edu.cn

引用本文:

李琪瑞, 杨知方, 李文沅. 面向差异化电源成本结构的容量市场机制设计[J]. 电工技术学报, 0, (): 231474-231474. Li Qirui, Yang Zhifang, Li Wenyuan. Capacity Market Mechanism Design for Power Sources with Differentiated Cost Structures. Transactions of China Electrotechnical Society, 0, (): 231474-231474.

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https://dgjsxb.ces-transaction.com/CN/10.19595/j.cnki.1000-6753.tces.231474 https://dgjsxb.ces-transaction.com/CN/Y0/V/I/231474

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