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| Double-Layer Pricing Model of Power Grid Based on Rubinstein Game under the Influence of Source-Side and Load-Side Uncertainty |
| Li Lixing1, 2, Miao Shihong1, 2, Yu Jing3, Tu Qingyu1, 2, Duan Simo1, 2 |
1. State Key Laboratory of Advanced Electromagnetic Engineering and Technology School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan 430074 China;
2. Hubei Electric Power Security and High Efficiency Key Laboratory School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan 430074 China;
3. State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co. Ltd Nanjing 210000 China |
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Abstract With the further opening of the electricity market and the increasing in the penetration rate of renewable energy sources, the complexity of power grid electricity transactions have brought challenges to the operation of power grids. This paper proposes a dual-tier pricing model based on Rubinstein game under the influence of source-side and load-side uncertainty. First, based on the current opening process of China's electricity market, a two-tiered pricing mechanism for scheduling game with consideration of maximizing social welfare is established. Secondly, considering the influence of uncertainties on both sides of source and load, a stochastic chance-constrained programming model for large power grid is established. Finally, based on Rubinstein's dynamic game model, the multi-agent bargaining mechanism under complete information is established, and the game subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is solved. Taking the PJM5 node system as an example, the simulation results verify the validity of the model. The results show that the proposed method satisfies the interests of all participants, reduces the cost of power generation, and realizes the improvement of total social benefits and wind power consumption.
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Received: 01 July 2018
Published: 02 January 2020
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Corresponding Authors:
国家重点研发计划（2017YFB0902600）、国家电网公司科技项目（SGJS0000DKJS1700840）和国家自然科学基金（51777088）资助项目
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2019, Vol. 34 
